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Abstract
We study the problem of providing workﬂow data provenance without revealing the functionality of any module.
We develop a model that formalizes the notion of privacy of modules embedded in a workﬂow structure as a natural
extension of privacy of standalone modules. Our model shows that by hiding a small amount of carefully chosen
data, one can ensure privacy of all modules over an unbounded number of executions. The problem of identifying
the smallest possible amount of such data is NP-hard, and in the full generality of our model it is in fact even hard to
get a good approximation. However, we are able to design good approximation algorithms for optimizing the amount
of hidden data when either the privacy model is slighted restricted or there is bounded sharing of data items among
various modules.
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1 Introduction
Scientiﬁc workﬂow systems (e.g. myGrid/Taverna, Kepler, VisTrails, Pegasus (see [25, 7, 17])) are extensively used
for specifying and executing in-silico experiments or processes. Such a system can be thought of as a program,
producing a set of final output data from a set of initial input data in an execution. Internally, a workﬂow system
comprises a set of modules (i.e. programs) with input and output data ports. An output port of a module is connected
to a set of input ports of other modules (called internal connections) and/or has an external connection if it produces
final output data. On the other hand, an input port of a module either receives input data from the output port of another
module on an internal connection or has an external connection on which it receives initial input data. In addition to
initial input data and ﬁnal output data, an execution of a workﬂow also produces intermediate data, i.e. data produced
by a module at an output port that does not have an external connection. Intermediate data produced by a module is
passed along internal connections to input ports of other modules. Parameters can also be speciﬁed for modules and,
for uniformity, are considered to be initial inputs as well. In this paper, we assume that the connections form an acyclic
graph on the modules, which is common in many of the aforementioned workﬂow systems [17, 25].
Once speciﬁed, a workﬂow may be executed multiple times using different initial input data and generating much
intermediate and ﬁnal output data. To keep track of how the different output data were generated and ensure their
reproducibility, many workﬂow systems are beginning to provide tools to capture and manage data provenance. Data
provenance is deﬁned as the set of dependencies between data (initial input, intermediate and ﬁnal output) pertaining
to an execution, including the module executions that produced them.
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Figure 1: Example of a workﬂow execution
A simple example of a workﬂow is shown in Figure 1 which (for simplicity) uses boolean data and functions.
There are two input data bits d1 and d2, and three modules v1,v2 and v3 with underlying functions f1, f2 and f3 deﬁned
as follows: f1 computes two intermediate data bits d3 and d4, where d3 = d1 and d4 = d1∨d2. f2 produces one output
data bit d5 which is 1 iff d3 = d4, while the other output data bit d6 = 1− d4 is produced by f3. A source node s
distributes initial input data to input ports (along e1 and e2), and a sink node t collects ﬁnal output data from the output
ports (along e6 and e7), corresponding to external connections. Note that the data bit d4 produced by v1 acts as input
to both v2 and v3; in general, a data output by a module can act as input to multiple modules as well as (possibly) be a
ﬁnal output data. We call this phenomenon data sharing. Also, observe that a workﬂow may be a multigraph: in this
example, v1 sends two data bits d3 and d4 to v2.
Figure 1 also shows a sample execution of the workﬂow when d1 = 0 and d2 = 1 are the initial inputs; then d3 = 0,
d4 = 1, d5 = 1 and d6 = 0. In this execution, the provenance of d6 = 0 includes data values d1 = 0,d2 = 1 and d4 = 1,
and modules v1 and v3. On the other hand, the provenance of d5 = 1 includes data values d1 = 0,d2 = 1,d3 = 0 and
d4 = 1, and modules v1 and v2.
Although provenance is important, if information about all intermediate data is repeatedly given for multiple
executions of a workﬂow on different initial inputs, it may end up exposing partial or complete functionality of some
of the modules. As an example, consider the module v3. For input d1 = 0,d2 = 1, d4 = 1 and d6 = 0, while for
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input d1 = 0,d2 = 0, d4 = 0 and d6 = 1. Clearly, provenance data for module v3 for these two executions exposes the
function f3. However, workﬂow modules may involve proprietary code or algorithms, requiring that their functionality
be kept private. Therefore the workflow owner would like to limit the amount of provenance data that she gives the
user for any execution of a workﬂow to ensure privacy of modules in terms of their functionality. But for the workﬂow
to be practically meaningful, it is unrealistic to hide the initial input or the ﬁnal output data. In this paper, we achieve
privacy of modules in a workﬂow by hiding a carefully chosen subset of intermediate data.
In Figure 1, suppose that the workﬂow owner hides bit d4. Now, even if the workﬂow is executed an arbitrary
number of times, the user gets no information about function f3, and some partial information about functions f1 and
f2. To decide whether f1 and f2 remain private, we need to quantify the notion of privacy of modules in a workﬂow.
We will give a formal deﬁnition later, but for now, we informally say that a module is ε-private for some parameter
0< ε < 1 if given any input to the module, the user can guess the correct output with probability at most ε . It can be
shown that hiding d4 gives 12 -privacy for v1,v2 and v3.
Clearly, identical privacy guarantees for modules can be achieved by hiding different subsets of intermediate data.
For example, hiding both d3 and d4 gives 12 -privacy for modules v1,v2 and v3, but since the bit d4 is shared by the
inputs of both v2 and v3, hiding only this bit gives the same privacy guarantee. Moreover, some data may be more
important than others, or may be contain more information, necessitating the introduction of a cost function which
assigns a cost to each data item in the workﬂow. The cost of an item indicates the utility lost to the user when a data
is hidden. Assuming that all initial input and ﬁnal output data should always be visible, the following question arises:
what is the minimum cost of intermediate data that can be hidden while guaranteeing that individual modules are
ε-private for some given parameter ε > 0? We call this the SECURE VIEW problem. In this paper, we deﬁne and offer
algorithmic solutions to this problem.
The data model considered in this paper is general enough to capture most practical applications. We assume that
each data d is a binary string that comes from a ﬁxed (but unbounded, and possibly inﬁnite) domain D ⊆ {0,1}∗.
Therefore, a module with p input ports and q output ports takes as input p binary strings, computes a function on them
and outputs q binary strings. For example, a module might read two input strings, interpret them as integers and output
their sum and product. Then, the function computed by the module maps from the set ({0,1}∗)2 to itself.
We also assume that the user gets to see all connections between modules in the workﬂow, only the values of
some data are hidden. Thus the data values on all connections carrying those data are hidden in all executions of the
workﬂow.
RelatedWork. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous work that deals with security in a workﬂow is [9]. The
paper develops a framework to output a partial view of the workﬂow that conforms to a given set of access permissions
on the connections and input/output ports. However, their treatment of the notion of privacy is somewhat informal, and
no guarantees on the quality of the solution are provided. Furthermore, in our problem, hiding internal connections
may lead to disconnected input and output ports, potentially disconnecting the workﬂow network. Another relative
weakness of the approach [9] is that it reveals less provenance information than our mechanism of only hiding data
values, since the dependency of visible data on the modules is unknown to the user.
A related domain that has received considerable attention is that of privacy-preserving data mining (see surveys [2,
29], and the references therein). Here, the goal is to hide individual data attributes while retaining the suitability of
the data for mining patterns. For example, the technique of anonymizing data makes each record indistinguishable
from a large enough set of other records in certain identifying attributes [28, 21, 3]. Privacy preserving approaches
have been studied for social networks [19, 6, 26, 8], auditing queries [24, 22] and in other contexts. Another widely
used technique is that of data perturbation where some noise (usually random) is added to the the output of a query
or to the underlying database. This technique is often used in statistical databases, where a query computes some
aggregate function on the dataset [1, 10]. Privacy in statistical databases is often quantiﬁed using the framework of
differential privacy, which requires that the output distribution is almost invariant to the inclusion of any particular
record (see [14, 18, 13, 15] and surveys [11, 12]). However, in the context of data provenance, the goal is to hide
module functionality rather than particular data items, hence there does not seem to be an obvious extension of the
notion of differential privacy to our context. Further, for provenance information to be useful, individual data items
that are revealed must be accurate, especially for applications such as ensuring reproducibility of experiments. Thus,
adding noise to provenance information renders it useless. It would be interesting to see if the notion of privacy of
functions that we introduce in this paper lends itself to a new notion of differential privacy of functions.
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Contributions. Our ﬁrst contribution is to formalize the notion of ε-privacy of a module when it is a standalone
entity (called the standalone module privacy) as well as when it is a component of a workﬂow (called the in-network
module privacy), interacting with other modules. While standalone module privacy can be naturally captured in
terms of input and output data at the module interface that needs to be hidden, the notion of in-network privacy of
a module is inherently linked to the network topology of the workﬂow and functionality of other modules. Even so,
we are able to show that the problem of ensuring in-network privacy of a workﬂow of modules essentially reduces
to implementing the standalone privacy requirements for each module. Building on this connection, we develop
algorithms and complexity results for the SECURE VIEW problem, deﬁned as the problem of ensuring in-network
privacy of all modules in a workﬂow by hiding the smallest amount of data. The standalone privacy requirement
of each module in a workﬂow can be speciﬁed in the most general form as a list of pairs of input-output data sets
(called set constraints) that need to be hidden to ensure ε-privacy. Alternately, a more succinct but less expressive
representation is to specify a list of pairs of numbers (called cardinality constraints) for each module such that hiding
at least as many input and output data as speciﬁed in any pair guarantees standalone privacy for that module. Both
variants of the SECURE VIEW problem are easily shown to be NP-hard, and thus we focus on poly-time approximation
algorithms1 for these problems.
Our second key contribution is a linear-programming (LP) based approach to obtain an O(logn)-approximation
for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints. Moreover, we show that this is the best possible ap-
proximation guarantee achievable in poly-time, modulo standard complexity-theoretic assumptions. In contrast, we
show that the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints is much harder to approximate: in particular, we show that
for some ε > 0, it is εmax-hard to approximate under standard complexity assumptions, where max is the length of
longest requirement list for any module. On the other hand, an max-approximation is easily achievable in poly-time,
again using an LP-based approach. Finally, we show that both variants of the SECURE VIEW problem becomes more
tractable when the workﬂow has bounded data sharing, i.e. when a data in the workﬂow acts as input to at most γ
modules for some constant γ . We give a (γ +1)-approximation algorithm for this situation, and show that the problem
is APX-hard2 to approximate even when there is no data sharing (i.e. γ = 1).
Organization. Section 2 deﬁnes the notions of standalone and in-network ε-privacy. We formalize the SECURE
VIEW problem in Section 3, and then establish a connection between standalone and in-network privacy of modules
in Section 4. We present our approximation results for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality and set constraints
in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 6, we also present approximation results for the SECURE VIEW problem
with bounded data sharing.
2 Module Privacy in a Workflow
In this section we formalize the notion of module privacy in a workﬂow, which we call in-network module privacy.
We start with the simpler notion of standalone module privacy, which deﬁnes the privacy of a module when it appears
alone (and not as part of a workﬂow). We also introduce the notion of hiding input and output data of a module in
order to guarantee its privacy. We will assume throughout that all modules in a workﬂow are initially private, i.e. the
user has no apriori knowledge about the functionality of any module prior to the workﬂow executions.
We start with some terminology that is used throughout the paper. An index k is a positive integer, and an index
set I is a set of indices. Each data (initial, intermediate and ﬁnal) in a workﬂow is assumed to have a unique index.
Conversely, each index has a domain associated with it, namely the domain of the data it is associated with. We denote
the domain of index k by Dk. A data vector x is said to be defined on an index set I, denoted by x ∈ ∏k∈I Dk, if x
contains |I| strings, each of which is associated with a unique index k ∈ I and belongs to Dk. Then, x[k] denotes the
string in xmapped to index k. For a data vector x ∈∏k∈I Dk, and for any subset of indices J ⊆ I, x|J ∈∏k∈J Dk denotes
x restricted to the indices in J, i.e. x|J [k] = x[k] for all k ∈ J. Finally, for any J ⊆ I, the J-partition of I is a partition of
all data vectors in ∏k∈I Dk such that two data vectors x,y ∈∏k∈I Dk are in the same subset of the partition iff x|J = y|J .1An algorithm is said to be a μ(n)-approximation algorithm for some non-decreasing function μ(n) : N+ → N if on every input of size n it
computes a solution where the value is within a factor of μ(n) of the optimal algorithm.
2A problem is said to be APX-hard if there exists an ε0 > 0 such that a (1+ ε0)-approximation in poly-time would imply P= NP.
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2.1 Standalone Privacy of a Module
A standalone module v with input index set P and output index set Q computes a function f : ∏p∈PDp → ∏q∈QDq.
As a running example throughout this section, we use the following function, where each data is a single bit.
Example 1. Let v be a module with input bits x1,x2 and output bits x3,x4,x5. Suppose v computes function f :
{0,1}2 → {0,1}3 where x3 = x1∨ x2, x4 = x1∧ x2 and x5 = x1⊕ x2. The truth table of function f is given in Table 1.
Let P= {1,2} and Q= {3,4,5} be the input and output index sets of v in this example.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
Table 1: Truth table of the function f given in Example 1.
Our goal is to ensure that for any input x ∈ ∏p∈PDp to v, a user is not be able to guess the value of f (x) with
probability more than ε , for a given parameter ε > 0. To enforce privacy of module v, we will hide a set of input
and output data for each execution of the module; the remaining data will be visible. The input and output index sets
corresponding to the hidden data are called hidden input and output index sets, and denoted by Ph and Qh respectively.
Correspondingly, the visible input and output index sets are Pv = P\Ph and Qv = Q\Qh. On ﬁxing a particular data
set xv ∈ ∏p∈Pv Dp as the visible part of the input data, the user sees an arbitrary data vector from the set { f (x)|Qv :
xv = x|Pv} as the visible output. For instance, in Example 1, if Pv = {1} and Qv = {3,5}, and if the user sets xv to 0,
then she sees an arbitrary string in set {(0,1),(1,0)}, i.e. the visible output bits corresponding to an arbitrary row of
Table 1 containing x1 = 0. We allow the user to query the module an unbounded number of times on all settings of the
visible input data. The observed relation for function f with respect to the hidden index sets Ph and Qh is then deﬁned
as the set of all data that the user might see in an execution, i.e.
Rf ,Ph,Qh = {(x|Pv ,y|Qv) : x ∈ ∏
p∈P
Dp,y= f (x)}.
Note that there may be multiple functions g (besides f ) that would result in the same observed relation. For instance,
in Example 1, we can partition the output rows into those corresponding to x1 = 0 and x1 = 1, and then permute the
output rows inside each subset of the partition arbitrarily (keeping the input rows ﬁxed), to obtain another function
with the same observed relation. Such functions are called consistent functions.
Definition 1. A function g : ∏p∈PDp → ∏q∈QDq is said to be consistent with module v with respect to hidden index
sets Ph,Qh if Rg,Ph,Qh = Rf ,Ph,Qh. The set of all consistent functions for v with respect to Ph,Qh is denoted by Fv,Ph,Qh.
We are now ready to deﬁne standalone privacy of a module. Recall that intuitively, a function is ε-private if for
any input x, the user cannot guess the output with probability > ε . Given an input x, the output can be g(x) for
any consistent function g; hence the size of the set of images of x under all consistent functions is a measure of the
conﬁdence of a user in deciding the output corresponding to x.3
Definition 2. Given a parameter ε > 0 and hidden input and output index sets Ph and Qh, a module v is said to be
(Ph,Qh,ε)-private if |{g(x) : g ∈ Fv,Ph,Qh}| ≥
1
ε for every input string x ∈ ∏p∈PDp.
In general, more than one pair of index sets (Ph,Qh) can guarantee ε-privacy of a module. The privacy require-
ment (called a requirement list) can therefore be deﬁned as a list of index sets (called set constraints) sufﬁcient for
guaranteeing privacy.
Definition 3. A module v is said to be 〈L,ε〉SET-private, where L = {(Pj,Qj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ }, if for all 1 ≤ j ≤ , v is
(Pj,Qj,ε)-private.
3In fact, one can show that the privacy condition in Deﬁnition 2 is equivalent to the user not being able to guess f (x) with probability > ε for
any input x.
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In Example 1, let L = {(x1,x3),( /0,{x3,x4})}4 be a requirement list. Hiding any one input and one output bit, or
two output bits, yields 14 -privacy of v; thus, v is 〈L,
1
4 〉SET-private. On the other hand, if L = {({x1,x2}, /0)}, v is not
〈L, 14 〉-private.
One shortcoming of the above representation is that the requirement list could be exponential in the number of
input and output data. However, for many functions, the privacy requirement can be succinctly represented by a list
of pairs of numbers (called cardinality constraints), where the module is ε-private if the number of hidden input and
output data are at least the numbers speciﬁed by a pair. For instance, in Example 1, v is 14 -private if at least 2 output
bits or 1 input and 1 output bit are hidden. Thus, a possible requirement list for 14 -privacy is {(1,1),(0,2)}. On the
other hand, since hiding both input bits is not sufﬁcient, (2,0) cannot be part of any such list. Formally, we deﬁne
〈L,ε〉CARD-privacy for a standalone module as follows:
Definition 4. A module v is said to be 〈L,ε〉CARD-private, where L= {(α j,β j) : 1≤ j ≤ }, if for all Ph,Qh satisfying
|Ph| ≥ α j and |Qh| ≥ β j for some 1≤ j ≤ , v is (Ph,Qh,ε)-private.
Clearly, 〈L,ε〉CARD-privacy is a special case of 〈L,ε〉SET-privacy, and therefore might impose stricter privacy require-
ments on the module. However, the trade-off is that the size of a non-redundant list5 in this formulation is at most the
number of input or output data of the module.
2.2 Workflows: Networks of Modules
A workﬂow, also called a network of modules, is modeled by a directed acyclic multi-graph (DAG) G(V ∪{s, t},E)
with a single source node s and a single sink node t. The vertex setV = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn} represents the nmodules of the
workﬂow, computing functions f1, f2, . . . , fn respectively. The source node s acts as the distributor of the initial input
data to different modules in the workﬂow, and the sink node t aggregates all the ﬁnal output data. A module vi takes
as input the output data produced by one or more v j, or the initial input data distributed by s, and sends its output data
to the inputs of other vk and/or to the sink node t (see Figure 1).
The set of all data in the network, denoted by B, comprises the input data to the network (i.e. output data from s)
and all the output data from v1,v2, . . . ,vn. As mentioned previously, we assign a unique index to each data in B. Each
module vi has a ﬁxed subset of indices Pi ⊆ B as input and a ﬁxed subset of indices Qi ⊆ B as output; these are called
its input and output index sets. Hence for each module vi, fi :∏k∈Pi Dk → ∏k∈Qi Dk. The output index set of s and the
input index set of t are denoted by Qs and Pt respectively—they represent the initial input and the ﬁnal output data of
the workﬂow. The intermediate data B\ (Qs∪Pt) is denoted by Bint . For example, in the workﬂow given in Figure 1,
Qs = {d1,d2}, Pt = {d5,d6} and Bint = {d3,d4} are the initial input, ﬁnal output and intermediate data respectively.
The edges denote connections between modules in the workﬂow. Each edge e ∈ E carries a particular data in B,
deﬁned by a mapping φ : E(G) → B. Note that due to data sharing φ might not be a one-one map. For example, in
Figure1, φ(e4) = φ(e5) = d4.
Consider any assignment ρ :B→∏b∈BDb of the data in B. For an index set A⊆B, ρ(A) is deﬁned as the restriction
of ρ(B) to the index set A. A run of the workﬂow G represents an assignment of B in any particular execution of the
workﬂow.
Definition 5. A run of the workflow G is an assignment ρ : B→ ∏b∈BDb of the data in B such that for all 1≤ i≤ n,
fi(xi) = yi where xi = ρ(Pi) and yi = ρ(Qi).
For any set of candidate functions g= 〈g1,g2, . . . ,gn〉 for the modules v1,v2, . . . ,vn, we extend the notion of a run
ρ of G to ρg, by requiring that in Deﬁnition 5, yi = gi(xi) for each 1≤ i≤ n.
2.3 In-Network Privacy of a Module
Recall that the initial input and ﬁnal output data of the workﬂow (corresponding to the index set Qs ∪Pt) cannot be
hidden. For each data b in the hidden index set Bh ⊆ Bint , the value of ρ(b) is not revealed for any run ρ . On the
other hand, for each data b in the visible index set Bv = B \Bh, the value of ρ(b) is revealed for every run ρ . Then,
Phi = Pi ∩Bh and Pvi = Bv ∩Pi are the hidden and visible input index sets of vi respectively. Similarly, Qhi = Qi ∩Bh
and Qvi = Bv∩Qi are the hidden and visible output index sets respectively.
4We will often denote a singleton set {x} by x.
5In a non-redundant requirement list L, for any two pairs (α1,β1) and (α2,β2) ∈ L, either α1 < α2 and β1 > β2, or α1 > α2 and β1 < β2.
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Given a network G, a hidden index set Bh, and a sequence of candidate functions g= 〈g1, . . . ,gn〉 for the modules
v1, . . . ,vn, the observed relation for g with respect to Bh is deﬁned as
Rg,Bh = 〈(ρg(Pvi ),ρg(Qvi )) : 1≤ i≤ n〉
Definition 6. Let G be a workflow where module vi computes function fi :∏k∈Pi Dk→∏k∈Qi Dk, 1≤ i≤ n. A sequence
of functions
g= 〈gi : 1≤ i≤ n,gi : ∏
k∈Pi
Dk → ∏
k∈Qi
Dk〉
is said to be consistent for workflow G with respect to a set of hidden data Bh, if Rg,Bh = Rf,Bh . The set of all consistent
sequence of functions g for G with respect to Bh is denoted by FG,Bh .
For example, suppose bit d4 is hidden in the workﬂow depicted in Figure 1. Consider functions g1 = (d1,d1∨d2),
g2 = d3⊕d4 and g3 = d4. It can be veriﬁed that the visible bits produced by these functions are exactly identical to
those produced by f1, f2, f3, in any execution of the workﬂow. Therefore, g = 〈g1,g2,g3〉 is a consistent sequence of
functions for the workﬂow, with respect to the hidden bit d4.
Finally, we deﬁne ε-privacy of a workﬂow. The underlying intuition is the same as in the standalone case, namely
for any input to anymodule in the workﬂow, the user should not be able to guess the correct output of the module with
probability > ε .
Definition 7. Given a parameter ε > 0 and a set of hidden data Bh, network G is said to be 〈Bh,ε〉-private, if for each
1≤ i≤ n and each input xi ∈ ∏k∈Pi Dk to module vi, |{gi(xi) : g= 〈g1,g2, . . . ,gi, . . . ,gn〉,g ∈ FG,Bh}| ≥ 1ε .
3 The SECURE VIEW Problem
Having given a formal deﬁnition of module privacy, we now deﬁne the SECURE VIEW problem as that of minimizing
the total cost of hidden data while guaranteeing the required in-network privacy of the modules.
Formally, an instance of the SECURE VIEW problem comprises a network of modules represented by a single-
source, single-sink directed acyclic multi-graph G = (V ∪{s, t},E), where V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn} is the set of modules,
and s and t are respectively the source and sink nodes. We are also given a set of data items B and a mapping φ : E→ B
that indicates the data (or equivalently, index) corresponding to an edge. The set of all intermediate data is denoted by
Bint . Only intermediate data b ∈ Bint can be hidden, and cb is the cost of hiding data b. Cost of hiding data is assumed
to be additive, i.e. the cost of hiding a set of data Bh ⊆ Bint is c(Bh) = ∑b∈Bh cb. Then given a parameter ε > 0, and
the goal is to ﬁnd a minimum cost subset Bh such that G is 〈Bh,ε〉-private.
To make the problem tractable, the privacy requirement of the workﬂow is speciﬁed in terms of a requirement
list Li for each module vi ∈ V . Depending on the composition of the requirement lists, there are two variants of the
problem. In the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints, for each 1≤ i≤ n, Li = {(Pi j,Qi j) : 1≤ j ≤ i} is a list
of pairs of subsets of input and output data of vi such that vi is 〈Li,ε〉SET-private. On the other hand, in the SECURE
VIEW problem with cardinality constraints, for each 1≤ i≤ n, Li = {(αi j,βi j) : 1≤ j≤ i} is a list of pairs of numbers
such that vi is 〈Li,ε〉CARD-private.
Note that the requirement lists specify local conditions for ensuring privacy of standalone modules, whereas a
feasible solution requires global guarantees on their in-network privacy in the workﬂow. In the next section, we show
that satisfying the local conditions speciﬁed by the requirement list of a module not only guarantees its standalone
privacy, but also its in-network privacy in any workﬂow. This equivalence of standalone and in-network privacy
guarantees is somewhat surprising, because privacy properties of standalone modules are expected to weaken when
placed in a workﬂow due to mutual interaction. This connection simpliﬁes the deﬁnition of the SECURE VIEW problem
with set constraints (resp., cardinality constraints). Now, a feasible solution is a data set Bh ⊆ Bint such that for each
1≤ i≤ n, Bh ⊇ (Pi j ∪Qi j) (resp., |Bh∩Pi| ≥ αi j and |Bh∩Qi| ≥ βi j) for some 1≤ j ≤ i) for some 1≤ j ≤ i.
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4 Relationship between Standalone and In-network Module Privacy
We now show that if a pair of hidden input and output data vectors guarantee ε-privacy for a standalone module, they
also guarantee ε-privacy for the module in any workﬂow, irrespective of its network topology.
We will assume throughout that the modules V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn} are indexed in a topologically sorted order, and
that Pi and Qi denote the input and output index set of module vi respectively.
Theorem 1. Given a parameter ε > 0, for each 1≤ i≤ n, let Phi ⊆Pinti and Qhi ⊆Qinti be two subsets of the intermediate
input and output data of vi respectively such that vi is (Phi ,Qhi ,ε)-private as a standalone module. Then the entire
workflow is 〈Bh,ε〉-private where Bh = ∪i(Phi ∪Qhi ).
It is tempting to try to show that any choice of a consistent function for a standalone module with respect to
a particular pair of hidden input and output data vectors remains consistent for the module even when it is placed
in a workﬂow, provided the same data vectors are hidden in the workﬂow. The above theorem would then follow
immediately. However, it turns out that this is not true. In fact, the example below shows that the number of consistent
functions for a module might decrease doubly exponentially (in the number of inputs) when the module is placed in a
workﬂow.
Example 2. In this example, each data is a single bit. Let v be a module with k input and k output bits such that
the underlying function reverses the input bits, i.e. f (x1,x2, . . . ,xk) = (xk,xk−1, . . . ,x1). Let G be a workﬂow that
comprises two copies of v (call them v1 and v2) joined in series. Thus G computes the identity map.
Note that, ε-privacy of v can be ensured by hiding any  = log( 1ε ) output bits. (In fact, since f is a one-one
function, hiding  input bits of v also guarantees ε-privacy.) We compute the number of consistent functions of v with
a particular set of  hidden output bits. Given an input to v, the visible output bits are ﬁxed for any consistent function;
however, the hidden output bits can have arbitrary values. Thus, any input is mapped to one of L= 2 different outputs,
and any consistent function is an arbitrary combination of the mappings for individual inputs. Then the number of
consistent functions for v with  hidden output bits is L2k .
In workﬂow G, the output bits of v1 (i.e. the input bits of v2) are the only intermediate data. Suppose the same
 output bits of v1 as for the standalone v are hidden (this guarantees ε-privacy of both v1 and v2 as standalone
modules). To compute the number of consistent functions for v1 in the workﬂow with these hidden bits, we partition
the set of 2k different initial input strings into 2k/L groups, where all L strings in a group have the same values
of visible intermediate bits. Since both v1 and v2 are one-one functions, the workﬂow maps each such group to L
distinct ﬁnal outputs that are always visible. Therefore, v1 has to map the strings in each such group to L distinct
intermediate strings, implying that any consistent function for v1 is necessarily one-one. Such a one-one function
permutes the L intermediate strings corresponding to a group of L input strings. Thus, the total number of such
functions is (L!)2k/L  ((2πL)1/2L(L/e))2k . The number of consistent functions for module v therefore decreases by a
factor of
(
(2πL)1/2L
e
)2k
< 2−2k for any L≥ 2, i.e. ε ≤ 12 .
Theorem 1 shows that even though the number of consistent functions of a module can decrease substantially when
the module is placed in a workﬂow as shown above, the privacy guarantees remain unchanged. In proving Theorem 1,
our main technical result is Lemma 1, which states that given a set of hidden input and output data of a module, the set
of possible outputs for a particular input to the module remains unchanged when the module is placed in a workﬂow,
provided the same data are also hidden in the workﬂow. We continue to use Phi ,Qhi to denote the indices of the hidden
input and output data to vi, and, Pvi = Pi \Phi , Qvi = Qi \Qhi to denote the corresponding visible indices.
Lemma 1. Consider any module vi. Let X and Y be subsets of the Pvi -partition of ∏k∈Pi Dk and the Qvi -partition
of ∏k∈Qi Dk, and let x and y be any two data vectors in X and Y respectively. If there exists a w ∈ X such that
z = fi(w) ∈ Y , then there exists a sequence of functions g = 〈g j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n〉 with gi(x) = y that is consistent for
network G with respect to any set of hidden indices Bh ⊇ Phi ∪Qhi .
First we show how this lemma implies Theorem 1. Let x ∈ X and y ∈ Y be two data vectors, where X and Y are
subsets as deﬁned in the lemma. There exists a consistent function g with y = g(x) for vi as a standalone module
iff (x|Pvi ,y|Qvi ) ∈ Rfi,Phi ,Qhi is an observed input-output pair. Then, there must exist w ∈ X ,z ∈ Y (i.e. x|P
v
i
= w|Pvi and
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y|Qvi = z|Qvi ) such that fi(w) = z. The lemma claims that in this case, there exists a consistent sequence of functions
g = 〈g j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n〉 for workﬂow G with gi(x) = y, provided Phi and Qhi are also hidden in the workﬂow. Thus, the
number of images, under consistent functions, of any input to vi does not decrease when vi is placed in a workﬂow,
and Theorem 1 follows.
Before giving a formal proof of the lemma, we will give some intuition about our proof strategy. Consider a
simple special case, where all the modules are connected in a chain. Assume that only output data of any module vi
are hidden, i.e. Phi = /0. Then, w = w|Pvi = x|Pvi = x. Note that for g to be a consistent sequence of functions for the
workﬂow, the visible data values in any execution must remain identical to that for the actual sequence of functions
f = 〈 f1, f2, . . . , fn〉. However, the values of the hidden data might be different for an execution of the workﬂow with
module functions g and f. As a ﬁrst try, let g be exactly identical to f, except that gi(x) = y instead of z. Since y,z ∈ Y ,
they have exactly the same visible data values. Thus, g does not violate consistency in the output data of vi. However,
suppose that the visible parts of fi+1(y) and fi+1(z) do not match. Then, g violates the consistency requirement at the
output of vi+1 for an execution with x as the input to vi. To avoid this, we modify gi+1 (which is simply fi+1 at this
point) by adding a ﬁlter σ1 at the input of vi+1. σ1 is an identity map except that σ1(y) = z. Thus, the new gi+1 is the
composition of σ1 with fi+1, i.e. σ1 · fi+1. The previous violation is successfully avoided, but this modiﬁcation creates
a different consistency violation. Consider an execution where the input to vi is some x′ such that fi(x′) = y. For this
execution, the output of vi was originally fi+1(y), but is now gi+1(y) = fi+1(z). These two data vectors differ in their
visible parts, and therefore g violates the consistency property. To ﬁx this, we add a ﬁlter σ2 at the output of vi. σ2 is
an identity map except that σ2(y) = z and σ2(z) = y. Then, the new gi is fi ·σ2. Correspondingly, we replace the ﬁlter
σ1 at the input of vi+1 by a copy of σ2. Then, the new deﬁnition of gi+1 is σ2 · fi+1. It can be veriﬁed that g is now a
consistent sequence of functions.
However, the general case introduces additional complications. First, input data of vi might be hidden requiring us
to add ﬁlters at the input of vi. Further, due to data sharing, some of the hidden input data of vi might also act as input
to other modules—we need to add ﬁlters to the inputs of those modules as well. Finally, only a part of the output of a
module vi may act as input to another module v j. In this case, v j cannot distinguish between two different executions
where the output of module vi are distinct data vectors y and y′ respectively, if y and y′ are identical when restricted to
the input index set of v j. To handle this situation, we will make our ﬁlters more ﬁne-grained, as shown below.
To formally prove the lemma, we introduce some additional notation to capture the notion of input and output ﬁlters
that we described above. Let x∈∏i∈I Di and a,b∈∏ j∈J D j for two index sets I and J. Then, y= FLIPa,b(w)∈∏i∈I Di
is deﬁned as
y[i] =
⎧⎨
⎩
b[i] if i ∈ J and x[i] = a[i]
a[i] if i ∈ J and x[i] = b[i]
x[i] otherwise.
Note that FLIPa,b(FLIPa,b(x)) = x. In the proof of the lemma, we will also use the notion of function flipping, which
is deﬁned as follows.
Definition 8. Consider a function f : ∏p∈PDp → ∏q∈QDq. Let a,b ∈ ∏i∈I Di for some index set I. Then, ∀x ∈
∏p∈PDp, FLIP f ,a,b(x) = FLIPa,b( f (FLIPa,b(x))).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let a,b ∈ ∏k∈Pi∪Qi Dk be deﬁned as
a[k] =
{
x[k] if k ∈ Pi
y[k] if k ∈ Qi
and b[k] =
{
w[k] if k ∈ Pi
z[k] if k ∈ Qi.
(Note that Pi∩Qi = φ .) Then, for each 1≤ j ≤ n, we deﬁne g j = FLIP f j ,a,b.
First, we claim that gi maps x to y as desired. This holds since gi(x) = FLIP fi,a,b(x) = FLIPa,b( fi(FLIPa,b(x)))
= FLIPa,b( fi(w)) = FLIPa,b(z) = y.
To prove the consistency of g= 〈g1,g2, . . . ,gn〉 for G w.r.t. any set of hidden data Bh ⊇ Phi ∪Qhi , we need to show
that for any run ρ , the visible data are identical for ρf and ρg. We prove by induction on j the visible output data of
every module v j are identical in the two runs.
Let c j, f ,c j,g be the input data and d j, f ,d j,g the output data of module v j for ρf and ρg respectively, where the initial
input data is the same for both runs. Then, we prove that d j,g = FLIPa,b(d j, f ). Since x,w ∈ X , they differ only in the
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indices corresponding to hidden data; similarly, for y,z ∈ Y . Therefore the data vectors a and b only differ in hidden
indices. Then if the above claim is true, for every j, d j,g and d j, f are the same on the visible indices, and therefore the
visible data for both runs are the same.
Note that if the inductive hypothesis holds for all j′ < j, then c j,g = FLIPa,b(c j, f ), since the modules are listed in
a topological order. Thus,
d j,g = g j(c j,g) = FLIP f j ,a,b(FLIPa,b(c j, f ))
= FLIPa,b( f j(FLIPa,b(FLIPa,b(c j, f ))))
= FLIPa,b( f j(c j, f )) = FLIPa,b(d j, f ).
5 The SECURE VIEW Problem with Cardinality Constraints
In this section, we give an O(logn)-approximation algorithm for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality con-
straints. In addition, we show that this problem is Ω(logn)-hard under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions,
even if the cost of hiding each data is identical and the requirement list of every module in the workﬂow contains
exactly one pair of numbers.
5.1 O(logn)-Approximation Algorithm
Our algorithm is based on rounding the fractional relaxation (called the LP relaxation) of the integer linear program
(IP) for this problem presented in Figure 2.
Minimize ∑b∈Bint cbxb subject to
i∑
j=1
ri j ≥ 1 ∀1≤ i≤ n (1)
∑
b∈Pi
ybi j ≥ ri jαi j ∀1≤ i≤ n, ∀1≤ j ≤ i (2)
∑
b∈Qi
zbi j ≥ ri jβi j ∀1≤ i≤ n, ∀1≤ j ≤ i (3)
i∑
j=1
ybi j ≤ xb, ∀1≤ i≤ n,∀b ∈ Pinti (4)
i∑
j=1
zbi j ≤ xb, ∀1≤ i≤ n,∀b ∈ Qinti (5)
ybi j ≤ ri j, ∀1≤ i≤ n, ∀1≤ j ≤ i, ∀b ∈ Pinti
(6)
zbi j ≤ ri j, ∀1≤ i≤ n, ∀1≤ j ≤ i, ∀b ∈ Qinti
(7)
xb,ri j,ybi j,zbi j ∈ {0,1} (8)
Figure 2: An IP for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraint
Recall that each module vi has a requirement list Li = {(αi j,βi j) : 1≤ j≤ i}. A feasible solution must ensure that
for each 1≤ i≤ n, there exists a j such that at least αi j input data and βi j output data of vi are hidden.
In this IP, xb = 1 if data b is hidden, and ri j = 1 if at least αi j input data and βi j output data of module vi are hidden.
Then, ybi j = 1 (resp., zbi j = 1) if both ri j = 1 and xb = 1, i.e. if data b contributes to satisfying the input requirement αi j
(resp., output requirement βi j) of module vi. Let us ﬁrst verify that the IP indeed solves the SECURE VIEW problem
with cardinality constraints. For each module vi, constraint (1) ensures that for some 1≤ j≤ i, ri j = 1. In conjunction
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with constraints (2) and (3), this ensures that for some 1≤ j ≤ i, (i) at least αi j input data of vi have ybi j = 1 and (ii)
at least βi j output data of vi have zbi j = 1. But, constraint (4) (resp., constraint (5)) requires that whenever ybi j = 1
(resp., zbi j = 1), data b be hidden, i.e. xb = 1, and a cost of cb be added to the objective. Thus the set of hidden data
satisfy the privacy requirement of each module vi and the value of the objective is the cost of the hidden data. Note that
constraints (6) and (7) are also satisﬁed since ybi j and zbi j are 0 whenever ri j = 0. Thus, the IP represents the SECURE
VIEW problem with cardinality constraints.
One can write a simpler IP for this problem, where the summations are removed from constraints (4) and (5), and
constraints (6) and (7) are removed altogether. To see the necessity of these constraints, consider the LP relaxation of
the IP, obtained by replacing constraint (8) with xb,ri j,ybi j,zbi j ∈ [0,1].
Suppose constraints (6) and (7) were missing from the IP, and therefore from the LP as well. For a particular
1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is possible that a fractional solution to the LP has ri j = 1/2 for two distinct values j1 and j2 of j, where
αi j1 > αi j2 and βi j1 < βi j2 . But constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can now be satisﬁed by setting ybi j1 = ybi j2 = 1
(resp., zbi j1 = zbi j2 = 1) for αi j1/2 input data (resp., βi j2/2 output data). However, (αi j1/2,βi j2/2)might not satisfy the
privacy requirement for i, forcing an integral solution to hide some data b with xb = 0. This will lead to an unbounded
integrality gap.
Now, suppose constraints (2) and (3) did not have the summation. For a particular 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is possible that
a fractional solution to the LP has ri j = 1/i for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can then be
satisﬁed by setting ybi j = 1/i for all 1≤ i, for max j{αi j} distinct input data (resp., max j{βi j} distinct output data).
Correspondingly, xb = 1/i for those data b. If all the αi js and βi js for different 1 ≤ j ≤ i have similar values, it
would mean that we are satisfying the privacy constraint for vi paying an i fraction of the cost of an integral solution.
This can be formalized to yield an integrality gap of maxi{i}, which could be n. Introducing the summation in the LP
precludes this possibility.
We round the fractional solution to the LP relaxation using Algorithm 1. For each 1≤ j ≤ i, let Pmini j and Qmini j be
the αi j input and βi j output data of vi with minimum cost. Then, Bmini represents Pmini j ∪Qmini j of minimum cost.
Algorithm 1 Rounding algorithm of LP relaxation of the IP given in Figure 2, Input: An optimal fractional
solution {xb|b ∈ Bint}, Output: A feasible SECURE VIEW solution Bh
1: Initialize Bh = φ .
2: For each b ∈ Bint , include b in Bh with probability min{1,16xb logn}.
3: For each module vi whose privacy requirement is not satisﬁed by Bh, add Bmini to Bh.
4: Return Bh.
Analysis. We can assume wlog that the requirement list Li for each vi ∈V is non-redundant, i.e. for all 1≤ j1 = j2≤ i,
either αi j1 > αi j2 and βi j2 < βi j1 , or αi j1 < αi j2 and βi j2 > βi j1 . We can thus assume that for each module vi, the list
Li is sorted in increasing order on the values of αi j and in decreasing order on the values of βi j. The following lemma
shows that step 2 satisﬁes the privacy requirement of each module with high probability
Lemma 2. Let vi be any module in V . Then with probability at least 1− 2/n2, there exists a 1 ≤ j ≤ i such that
|Phi | ≥ αi j and |Qhi | ≥ βi j.
Proof. Given a fractional solution to the LP relaxation, let 1 ≤ m ≤ i be the index corresponding to the median
(αi j,βi j), satisfying ∑m−1j=1 ri j < 1/2 and ∑mj=1 ri j ≥ 1/2. We will show that after step 2, at least αim input data and βim
output data is hidden with probability at least 1−2/n2 for module vi.
We partition the set of intermediate data Bint into two sets: the set of data deterministically included in Bh, Bdet =
{b : xb ≥ 1/16logn}, and the set of data probabilistically rounded, Bprob = Bint \Bdet . Also, let Bround = Bh \Bdet
be the set of intermediate data that are actually hidden among Bprob. For each module vi, let Pdeti = Bdet ∩ Pinti
and Qdeti = Bdet ∩Qinti be the set of hidden input and output data in Bdet respectively. Let the size of these sets be
αdeti = |Pdeti | and β deti = |Qdeti |. Also, let Pprobi =Bprob∩Pinti andQprobi =Bprob∩Qinti . Finally, let Proundi =Bround∩Pinti
and Qroundi = Bround ∩Qinti . We show that for any module vi, |Proundi | ≥ αim−αdeti and |Qroundi | ≥ βim− β deti with
probability at least 1−1/n2.
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First we show that∑b∈Pprobi xb≥ (αim−α
det
i )/2. Constraint (2) implies that∑b∈Pinti ybi j ≥ ri jαi j, while constraint (6)
ensures that ∑b∈Pdeti ybi j ≤ ri jα
det
i . Combining these, we have
∑
b∈Pprobi
ybi j ≥ ri j(αi j−αdeti ). (9)
From constraint (4), we have
∑
b∈Pprobi
xb ≥ ∑
b∈Pprobi
i∑
j=1
ybi j ≥
i∑
j=m
∑
b∈Pprobi
ybi j.
Then, from Eqn. (9),
∑
b∈Pprobi
xb ≥
i∑
j=m
ri j(αi j−αdeti )≥ (αim−αdeti )
i∑
j=m
ri j.
Finally, using constraint (1), we conclude that
∑
b∈Pprobi
xb ≥
αim−αdeti
2
. (10)
Similarly, since ∑mj=1 ri j ≥ 1/2 and the list Li is sorted in decreasing order of βi j, it follows that
∑
b∈Qprobi
xb ≥
βim−β deti
2
. (11)
Next we show that |Proundi | ≥ αim−αdeti with probability ≥ 1− 1/n2. Each b ∈ Bprob is independently included in
Bround with probability 16xb logn. Hence, by Eqn. (10),
E[|Proundi |] = ∑
b∈Pprobi
16xb logn≥ 8(αim−αdeti ) logn.
Using Chernoff bound6, |Bround ∩ Pinti | ≤ αim − αdeti with probability at most 1/n2. Similarly, using Eqn. (11),
|Qroundi | ≤ βim−β deti with probability at most 1/n2. The lemma follows by using union bound over the failure proba-
bilities.
Using Lemma 2, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 gives a feasible solution with expected cost O(logn) times the optimal.
Proof. Using union bound over the set of modules in the above lemma, we conclude that with probability at least
1−2/n, the solution produced by the rounding algorithm after step 2 is feasible. By linearity of expectation, the cost
of the rounded solution at this stage is at most 16logn times that of the LP solution, and therefore O(logn) times that
of the optimal cost. If all modules are not satisﬁed after step 3, the cost of the data added to Bh in step 3 is at most O(n)
times the optimal. However, this happens with probability at most 2/n; thus the expected total cost of the solution
produced by this algorithm remains O(logn) times the optimal cost.
6If X is sum of independent boolean random variables with E[X ] = μ , then Pr[X ≤ μ(1− ε)]≤ e
−με2
2 (see, for instance, [23]).
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5.2 Ω(logn)-Hardness
The following theorem shows that Algorithm 1 produces an optimal answer upto a constant factor.
Theorem 3. It is not possible to approximate the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints within a factor
of o(logn) unless NP⊆ DTIME(nO(log logn)) even if the maximum list size max = 1 and each data has unit cost.
We give a reduction from the minimum set cover problem to this version of the SECURE VIEW problem where
max = 1 and each data has unit cost. Since set cover is hard to approximate within a factor of o(logn) unless NP ⊆
DTIME(nO(log logn)) [16, 20], the hardness result of the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints follows
under the same assumption.
An instance of the set cover problem consists of an input universe U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un}, and a set of its subsets
S= {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm}, i.e. each Si ⊆U . The goal is to ﬁnd a set of subsets T⊆ S of minimum size (i.e. |T| is minimized)
subject to the constraint that ∪Si∈TSi =U .
We create an instance G = (V ∪{s, t},E) of the SECURE VIEW problem, where the set of modules V contains a
module vi corresponding to each element ui ∈U , and an additional module z. There is a single edge (s,z) from s to z,
a set of edges {ei j : Si  u j} from z to each v j, and a single edge e j from each v j to the sink node t. The edge (s,z)
uniquely carries data bs, and each edge e j uniquely carries data b j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. All edges {ei j : j ∈ Si} carry the
same data ci, 1≤ i≤m. Note that only {ci : 1≤ i≤m} are intermediate data, and therefore can be hidden; the cost of
hiding each such data is 1. The privacy requirement for z is any single data carried by one of its outgoing edges, while
that for each vi is any single data carried by one of its incoming edges. Note that the maximum list size max is 1.
If the minimum set cover problem has a cover of size k, hiding the data corresponding to the subsets selected in
the cover produces a solution of cost k for this instance of the SECURE VIEW problem. Conversely, if a solution to the
SECURE VIEW problem hides a set of k data in {ci : 1≤ i≤ m}, selecting the corresponding sets produces a cover of
k sets.
6 The SECURE VIEW Problem with Set Constraints
We now consider the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints. Let max be the maximum size of the requirement
list of a module. We show the following theorem.
Theorem 4. UnlessNP⊆DTIME(npolylog n), the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints cannot be approximated
to within a factor of εmax for some ε > 0. The hardness result holds even when max is a (sufficiently large) constant,
and each data has unit cost. Further, it is possible to get a factor max-approximation in polynomial time.
We give an max-approximation algorithm for this problem in the appendix.
6.1 εmax-Hardness
The hardness result in Theorem 4 is obtained by a reduction from theminimum label cover problem [5]. An instance of
the minimum label cover problem consists of a bipartite graph H = (U,W,EH), a label set L, and a non-empty relation
Ruw ⊆ L×L for each edge (u,w) ∈ EH . A feasible solution is a label assignment to the vertices, A :U ∪V → 2L, such
that for each edge (u,w), there exist 1 ∈ A(u), 2 ∈ A(w) such that (1, 2) ∈ Ruw. The objective is to ﬁnd a feasible
solution that minimizes ∑u∈U∪W |A(u)|.
Unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog n), the label cover problem is |L|ε -hard to approximate for some constant ε > 0 [5,
27]. The instance of the SECURE VIEW problem in the reduction has max = |L|2. Theorem 4 follows immediately.
Given an instance of the label cover problem as deﬁned above, we create an instance G = (V ∪{s, t},E) of the
SECURE VIEW problem (refer to Figure 3). For each edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there is a module xuw ∈ V . In addition, V
has another module z. As shown in Figure 3, there are three kinds of edges in V : (i) a single edge ez from the source
node s to z, (ii) a set of |2L| parallel edges euw,u, from z to each xuw indexed by one of u or w and a label  ∈ L,
and (iii) a single euw edge from each xuw to the sink node t. Edge ez and euw, for each (u,w) ∈ E, uniquely carry
data bz and buw respectively, whereas data bu, is carried by all edges euw,u,. Note that bu, are the only intermediate
data in the workﬂow; the cost of hiding each such data is 1. The requirement list of z contains singleton subsets of
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Figure 3: Reduction from label cover: bold edges correspond to (p, p′) ∈ Ruw.
each intermediate data, while that of xuw, for each (u,w) ∈ E, contains pairs of data corresponding to members of the
relation Ruw, i.e Luw = {(bu,1 ,bw,2) : (1, 2) ∈ Ruw}.
The following lemma proves the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 3. The label cover instance H has a solution of cost k iff the SECURE VIEW instance G has a solution of cost
k.
Proof. Let A :U ∪W → 2L be a solution of the label cover instance H with total cost k = ∑u∈U∪W |A(u)|. We create a
solution Bh for the SECURE VIEW instance G as follows: for each u ∈U ∪W , and  ∈ L, add bu, to Bh iff  ∈ A(u).
We claim that Bh is a feasible solution for G. For each u ∈U ∪W , A(u) is non-empty; hence, the requirement of z is
trivially satisﬁed. Since A is a valid label cover solution, for each (u,w) ∈ EH , there exists 1 ∈ A(u) and 2 ∈ A(w)
such that (1, 2) ∈ Ruw. Hence for the same pair (1, 2), (bu,1 ,bw,2) ∈ Lxuw , and both bu,1 ,bw,2 ∈ B
h. This satisﬁes
the requirement for all xuw ∈V .
Conversely, let Bh be a solution of the SECURE VIEW instance G, where |Bh| = k. Note that Bh can include only
the intermediate data. For each u ∈U ∪W , we deﬁne A(u) = {|bu, ∈ Bh}. Clearly, ∑u∈U∪W |A(u)| = k. For each
xuw ∈V , the requirement of xuw is satisﬁed by Bh; hence there exist 1, 2 ∈ L such that bu,1 ,bw,2 ∈ B
h. This implies
that for each edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there exist 1 ∈ A(u) and 2 ∈ A(w), where (1, 2) ∈ Ruw, thereby proving feasibility.
Remark. If N = |U |+ |W |, the label cover problem is also known to be Ω(2log1−γ N)-hard to approximate for all
constant γ > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog n) [5, 27]. Thus, the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints is
Ω(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate as well, for all constant γ > 0, under the same complexity assumption.
6.2 max-Approximation Algorithm
Here we give an max-approximation algorithm for the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints as claimed in
Theorem 4. The algorithm rounds the solution given by LP relaxation of the following integer program:
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Minimize ∑b∈Bint cbxb subject to
i∑
j=1
ri j ≥ 1 ∀1≤ i≤ n (12)
xb ≥ ri j ∀b ∈ Pi j ∪Qi j, ∀1≤ i≤ n (13)
xb,ri, j ∈ {0,1} (14)
The LP relaxation is obtained by changing Eqn. (13) to
xb,ri j ∈ [0,1]. (15)
The rounding algorithm outputs Bh = {b : xb ≥ 1/max}.
Since the maximum size of a requirement list is max, for each i, there exists a j such that in the solution of the LP,
ri j ≥ 1/i ≥ 1/max. Hence there exists at least one 1≤ j ≤ i such that Pi j ⊆ Phi ,Qi j ⊆ Qhi . Since c(Bh) is most max
times the cost of LP solution, this algorithm gives an max-approximation.
7 The SECURE VIEW Problem with Bounded Data Sharing
The SECURE VIEW problem becomes substantially easier to approximate if the workﬂow has bounded data sharing,
i.e. when every data d produced by some module is either a ﬁnal output data or is an input data to at most γ other
modules. Though the problem remains NP-hard even with this restriction, the following theorem shows that it is
possible to approximate it within a constant factor when γ is a constant.
Theorem 5. There is a (γ +1)-approximation algorithm for both versions of the SECURE VIEW problem when each
data acts as input to at most γ modules. On the other hand, both versions of the problem remain APX-hard even when
there is no data sharing (i.e. γ = 1), each data has unit cost, and max is 2.
First, we give a (γ +1)-approximation algorithm for the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints, where each data
is shared by at most γ edges. This also implies an identical approximation factor for the cardinality version. Then, we
show that the cardinality version of the problem is APX-hard, i.e. there exists a constant c> 1 such that it is NP-hard
to obtain a c-approximate solution to the problem. The set version is therefore APX-hard as well.
7.1 (γ +1)-Approximation Algorithm
Recall that the input to the problem includes a requirement list Li = {(Pi j,Qi j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} for each module vi. Let
(Pi j∗ ,Qi j∗) be a minimum cost pair for module vi, i.e. c(Pi j∗ ∪Qi j∗) = minij=1 c(Pi j ∪Qi j). The algorithm greedily
satisﬁes the (Pi j∗ ,Qi j∗) requirement for each module vi, i.e. the set of hidden data Bh =
⋃
1≤i≤n(Pi j∗ ∪Qi j∗).
Note that each intermediate data is an input to at most γ modules. In any optimal solution, assume that each
terminal module of every hidden edge carrying this data pays its cost. Then, the total cost paid by the modules is at
most γ +1 times the cost of the optimal solution. On the other hand, the total cost paid by any module is at least the
cost of the edges incident on the module that are hidden by the algorithm. Thus, the solution of the algorithm has cost
at most γ +1 times the optimal cost.
A very similar greedy algorithm with the same approximation factor can be given to the SECURE VIEW problem
with cardinality constraints.
7.2 APX-Hardness
We give a reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem in cubic graphs to the SECURE VIEW problem with
cardinality constraints. An instance of the vertex cover problem consists of an undirected graph G′(V ′,E ′). The goal
is to ﬁnd a subset of vertices S⊆V ′ of minimum size |S| such that each edge e ∈ E ′ has at least one endpoint in S.
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Given an instance of the vertex cover problem, we create an instance of the SECURE VIEW problemG(V ∪{s, t},E)
(see Figure 4). For each edge (u,v) ∈ E ′, there is a module xuv in V ; also there is a module yv for each vertex v ∈V ′.
In addition to these, V contains a single module z. For each xuv, the edge set E includes an edge (s,xuv) and edges
(xuv,yu) and (xuv,yv). There is an edge (yv,z) in E for every yv ∈V . Finally, there is an edge (z, t) in E.
There is no data sharing in the workﬂow, and hiding a data is equivalent to hiding the edge carrying it. So, we do
not introduce an explicit data set, and consider hiding edges instead of data. Note that only edges of the form (xuv,yu)
can be hidden, since they are the only ones carrying intermediate data; the cost of hiding each such edge is 1.






Figure 4: Reduction from vertex cover, the dark edges show a solution with cost |E ′|+ k, k = size of a vertex cover in
G′
Finally, we deﬁne the requirement list for each module in V . For each xuv, Luv = {(0,1)}, i.e. the requirement for
xuv is any single outgoing edge. For each yv, Lv = {(dv,0),(0,1)}, where dv is the degree of the v in G′. Hence the
requirement of the vertex yv is either all of its incoming edges, or a single outgoing edge. For vertex z, Lz = {(1,0)},
i.e. hiding any incoming edge sufﬁces.
Lemma 4. The vertex cover instance G′ has a solution of size k if and only if the SECURE VIEW instance G has a
solution of cost m′+ k, where m′ = |E ′| is the number of edges in G′.
Proof. Let S ⊆ V ′ be a vertex cover of G′ of size k. We create a create a set of hidden edges Bh for the SECURE
VIEW problem as follows: for each v∈ S, add (yv,z) to Bh. Further, for each xuv, if u /∈ S, add (xuv,yu) to Bh, otherwise
add (xuv,yv). We claim that Bh is a feasible solution for G. Clearly, the requirement is satiﬁed for each xuv, since one
outgoing edge is hidden; the same holds for all yv such that v∈ S. Assuming E ′ to be non-empty, any vertex cover is of
size at least one. Hence at least one incoming edge to z is hidden. Finally, for every yv such that v /∈ S, all its incoming
edges are hidden; if not, S is not a vertex cover. Hence Bh satisﬁes the requirement of all vertices in V . Since we hide
exactly one outgoing edge from all xuv, and exactly one outgoing edge from all yv where v ∈ S, the cost of the solution
is m′+ k.
Now assume that we have a solution Bh ⊆ B of the SECURE VIEW instance with cost |Bh| = k′. We can assume,
wlog, that for each xuv exactly one outgoing edge is included in Bh; if both (xuv,yu) and (xuv,yv) are in Bh, we arbitrarily
select one of u or v, say u, and replace the edge (xuv,yu) in Bh with the edge (yu, t) to get another feasible solution
without increasing the cost. We claim that the set S ⊆V ′ of vertices v such that (yv,z) ∈ Bh forms a vertex cover. For
any edge (u,v) ∈ E ′, if (xuv,yu) /∈ Bh, then (yu,z) ∈ Bh to satisfy the requirement of yu, and therefore u ∈ S; otherwise,
v ∈ S by the same argument. Hence S is a vertex cover. Since each vertex xuv has exactly one outgoing edge in Bh,
|S|= k′ −m′.
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To complete the proof, note that if G′ were a cubic graph, i.e. the degree of each vertex is at most 3, then the size
of any vertex cover k ≥ m′/3. It is known that vertex cover in cubic graphs is APX-hard [4]; hence so is the SECURE
VIEW problem with cardinality constraints and no data sharing. An exactly identical reduction shows that the SECURE
VIEW problem with set constraints and no data sharing is APX-hard as well.
8 Conclusions
We developed a model of privacy for module functionality in workﬂows where data are made public over repeated
workﬂow executions. Our model motivates a natural optimization problem, the SECURE VIEW problem, which seeks
to identify the smallest amount of intermediate data that needs to be hidden so that the functionality of every mod-
ule is kept private. We developed algorithms and hardness results that characterize the complexity of the SECURE
VIEW problem.
Our work suggests several promising directions for future exploration. One natural direction is to understand
the connection between the network topology and the tractability of the SECURE VIEW problem. In the presence
of unrestricted data sharing, our hardness results hold even for very simple network topologies (special cases of
series-parallel graphs). However, when there is no data sharing, our initial work suggests that the problem becomes
poly-time solvable for some interesting and natural classes of graphs (e.g., series-parallel graphs). A more ambitious
future direction is to develop models of privacy when some of the modules in the workﬂow are public, that is, the
underlying code is publicly available. In the absence of any restriction on the behavior of public modules, it is not
difﬁcult to construct workﬂows where the presence of such modules provably compromises privacy of proprietary
modules. Thus handling privacy in this more general setting requires identifying natural restrictions on the behavior
of public modules.
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